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DLD-017

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_________________
No. 12-1311
_________________
MARILYN KENT,
Appellant
v.
PHILADELPHIA D.H.S.
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-02558)
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel
____________________________________

Submitted on Appellant’s Motions to Reopen
and Motions for Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis,
and for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
October 18, 2012
Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 8, 2012)
_________________
OPINION
_________________
PER CURIAM
In April 2011, Marilyn Kent, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against

Philadelphia D.H.S., 1 claiming, among other things, “home invasion, rape, weapons,
child abuse . . . crime [and] corruption . . . [and] stalking.” At one point, she identified
the time at which the events occurred as “1985,” although she also made references to
“later,” “1989,” “2004,” and 16 years from 1985 (or maybe from 1989). Philadelphia
D.H.S. moved to dismiss her complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a plausible
claim and as time-barred, or under Rule 8 for failure to include a short and plain
statement of her claims, or, in the alternative, to strike the complaint under Rule 12(f) as
unintelligible and redundant.
On the ground that the complaint, with its vague and redundant allegations and
random legal citations, did not provide fair notice to the defendant, the District Court
granted the motion without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint. The District
Court directed Kent to provide a short and plain statement of the basis for the court’s
jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of her claims, and where appropriate, the
approximate dates of the events giving rise to her claims.
Kent filed an amended complaint in which she described similar events with
similar dates. She alleged at least some of the terrible things she described resulted from
Philadelphia D.H.S.’s failure to protect her and/or her children. Philadelphia D.H.S. filed
another motion to dismiss, arguing that the claims appeared to be entirely speculative and

1

The defendant that Kent identifies as “Philadelphia D.H.S.” is the Department of
Human Services of the City of Philadelphia. We will use Kent’s abbreviation for
convenience.
2

did not put the defendant on notice about what it needed to defend, and that the claims, to
the extent they could be understood, were time-barred and failed as a matter of law. Kent
responded by filing a “motion not to dismiss” in which she requested a trial and again
presented the allegations from her complaint and amended complaint and cited various
statutory provisions.
The District Court denied Kent’s “motion not to dismiss” and granted Philadelphia
D.H.S.’s motion to dismiss. The District Court dismissed Kent’s amended complaint
with prejudice, ruling that Kent had failed to state any claim upon which relief can be
granted. More specifically, the District Court provided three bases for its ruling: (1)
Kent’s claims appeared to be entirely speculative and vague and failed to put the
defendant on notice about what to respond to; (2) construing the claims in the light most
favorable to Kent, the claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations; and (3)
the claims failed as a matter of law because a civil action cannot be brought against a
department or division of the City of Philadelphia.
Kent filed a notice of appeal. She was directed to pay the filing and docketing
fees to the District Court or to submit a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“ifp”). She
submitted a ifp motion to the District Court, but not to us. Her appeal was dismissed for
failure to pay the fees. She promptly refiled her ifp motion with us. She was notified that
if she wished for her ifp motion to be considered, she had to file a motion to reopen.
Shortly thereafter, she filed her motion to reopen. When she was notified that if she were
granted ifp status, we would consider her appeal for possible dismissal pursuant to 28
3

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and possible summary action pursuant to our Local Rule 27.4 and
I.O.P. 10.6, she filed another motion requesting ifp status and another motion to reopen
her appeal.
We grant Kent’s first motion to reopen, see 3rd Cir. L.A.R. Misc. 107.2, and her
first motion to proceed ifp, see Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1976). We
deny her second motion to reopen and second motion to proceed ifp as unnecessary. We
have jurisdiction over her appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the
District Court’s decision is plenary. McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114,
115 (3d Cir. 2009). Upon review, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s decision
because no substantial issue is presented on appeal. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
As the District Court noted, Kent’s allegations were vague and did not properly
put the defendant on notice. Also, to the extent that any claims can be discerned from the
pleading, it is clear from the face of the amended complaint that they are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. Kent’s claims made pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, as
well as any state law claims, are governed by 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2),
Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for tort actions. See Kach v. Hose, 589
F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). They accrued when she knew or should have known of the
injuries on which her claims are based. See Sameric Corp. v. Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582,
599 (3d Cir. 1998). Considering her allegations, Kent knew of any injuries at the times
described in her complaint, for some, that was as long ago as 1985, for others, it was in
2004 or 2005 (or maybe 2006 at the latest). Even if the statute of limitations for all her
4

claims did not begin to run until the latest date she described, her claims, first presented
to the District Court in April 2011, were time-barred. Accordingly, the District Court
properly granted Philadelphia D.H.S.’s motion, denied Kent’s motion, and dismissed
Kent’s amended complaint. 2 See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d
1380, 1384 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994). We will affirm the District Court’s decision.

2

We also agree with the District Court that Philadelphia D.H.S., separate from the City
of Philadelphia, was not a proper defendant. 53 P.S. § 16257.
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